INSIGHT Weekly commentary

August 29, 2006

Iran: Nuclear Chronology and other Inconvenient Knowledge

Last week, the House Intelligence Committee released a report on “Iran as a Strategic Threat.” It was clearly orchestrated with the Cheney group in the White House to goad the intelligence agencies into harsher judgments about Iran’s nuclear intentions and its support of Hezbollah. 

A number of knowledgeable observers have deconstructed the report already, including Professor Juan Cole and former CIA analyst Ray McGovern.  Their conclusions echo the episodes that led the U.S. into the Iraq war, leading one to regard the House report as a trial balloon to see how much the news media and the public are willing to swallow in an election year.  Apparently, quite a bit: the report got major play and little criticism.

Among the complaints in this report (a Republican confection cooked up by the chair of the committee, Peter Hoekstra) is that Iran is involved with the Shia in Iraq—shocking though that is not—and supporting Hezbollah’s assault on Israel.  The connection to Hezbollah is long known, of course.  A legitimate debate exists about how much influence Iran and Syria have over Hezbollah, but it is mistaken to regard the group as a proxy for Tehran.  On Iraq, it would be surprising if Iran were not involved, and we knew this was probable when the invasion began in March 2003. 

Here we confront the difficult truth about Iran’s security.  Since 1980, when it was attacked by Iraq, Iran has had quite legitimate concerns about its security. One million people died in the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. supported (and saved) Saddam Hussein. President Reagan supplied Saddam with $5 billion in financial credits, military equipment, and real-time intelligence.  When Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran (and, indeed, against the Kurds), the U.S. looked away.  Iran has not forgotten. 

Hoekstra’s tirade asserts that nuclear ambitions in Iran began twenty years ago.  The chronology below shows otherwise—it began with the shah, our vassal, long before the Islamic revolution.  It demonstrates the intimate involvement of the West and the slow, slow progress of this nuclear “ambition.” The chronology does not show the hypocrisy of the U.S. (and France and Britain) insisting that Iran fulfill its treaty obligations while we fail to fulfill ours (Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty). 

Perhaps most significant, the chronology shows that the intelligence agencies have been estimating imminent disaster—the development of usable nuclear weapons—by Iran for 26 years.  Each and every estimate has been mistaken. Hoekstra and his handlers in the White House are asking the CIA to be more assertive in claiming imminent Iranian nukes--when this is precisely what the agency has been doing all along.

Iran does pose difficulties for peace and stability in the region.  But we are approaching it with the same belligerency that has created one disaster after another in the region.  Other approaches, including this tough-minded one from George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment, are available. 

The chronology is adapted from the excellent work done by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterrey Institute for International Studies.  It is tedious in parts but demonstrates the very slow progression of Iran's nuclear program, and, importantly, the phony alarms routinely set off by the U.S. in particular.  This is what we face today as well. 

-- John Tirman

Late 1950s, Iran shows interest in nuclear technology and purchases a research reactor from the U.S.
Sept. 1967, U.S. supplies >5 kg of enriched uranium and 112 g of plutonium for research reactor.
July 1, 1968, Iran signs NPT Treaty.
Dec. 1972, Iran announces it intends to build nuclear power plants within ten years
May 1974, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission chairman says U.S. might establish regional enrichment and reprocessing facilities in Iran; in the same period, nuclear cooperation with France, India, and Argentina is forged.
June 1974, Shah suggests Iran will have nuclear weapons “without a doubt and sooner rather than later,” but later denies the statement.
June 1974, Iran and France agree to transfer of five French 1000 MWe reactors and uranium.  U.S. and Iran agree to provision of two nuclear power reactors and enriched uranium fuel; State Dept asks to permit enriched fuel “at levels desired by the Shah.”
Nov. 1974  Iran agrees to purchase 2 nuclear reactors from Germany, two more from France.  The U.S. continues to seek large=scale deals on reactors and fuel, and in 1975 signs for eight reactors and fuel. 
Feb. 1975, Shah says that Iran has no intention to build nuclear weapons, but if small states begin to do so, he would reconsider.
1975-76.  Budget for Iran’s atomic agency jumps from $30 million to $1 billion.  Goal of 300 students to be sent abroad for nuclear training.  Iran increases interest in acquiring enrichment technology.
1976.  Uranium purchased from South Africa in return for help in building enrichment plant.
1975-78.  Iran continues buying spree of commercial nuclear plants and fuel from Germany, France, and the U.S., dealmaking that continues up to final weeks of Shah’s rule and despite U.S. intelligence stating that the Shah was seeking nuclear weapons capability.
1978-79.  Due to the growing weakness of the Shah’s political position, vendor countries begin to suspend building operations. Shah abdicates in January 1979.  Khomeini takes power in
1980.  Iran decides to resume work on its four unfinished nuclear reactors, requesting India’s help to complete the Bushehr nuclear power project. In 1982, Germany agrees to finish one of the two reactors.
March 1980. An intelligence source is cited in U.S. report that Iran's interest in new smaller reactors indicates a move to develop nuclear weapons.
1984.  A research reactor is opened at Isfahan with China’s help.  In March, Iraq attacks the Bushehr complex, as it does again in 1985. 
April 1984.  West German intelligence, cited in Jane’s Defence Weekly, claims that Iran could have a nuclear weapon within two years using enriched uranium from Pakistan.
Sept. 1985.  Foreign ministers of Syria, Libya, and Iran reportedly say they should develop nuclear weapons to counter Israel’s nuclear arsenal.
Early 1990s. Iran signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with the USSR, a military and scientific accord with China, receives dual use equipment from the US (1990-91), and is rumored to be getting help from North Korea on a weapons program.
June 1990. US National Intelligence Estimate states Iran is seeking nuclear weapons capability, and Jane’s says it is capable already.
October 1990.  AEOI meeting chaired by President Rafsanjani decides to rebuild Bushehr plants damaged by Iraq.
1991. Reports surface about Iran acquiring nuclear technology from Russia and nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, South Africa, and China, all with weapons overtones. Iran does recruit Russian nuclear scientists to work in its program.
May 1991.  Nucleonics Week reports that AEOI is not controlling all nuclear activities, but does not specify who else is involved. 
June 1991. The opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq tells Boston Globe that a special unit of the Revolutionary Guard has been formed to develop nuclear weapons.
Nov. 1991.  U.S. and Israel separately claim Iran could develop a nuclear weapon within 10-15 years; U.S. says Iran is seeking nuclear weapons technology and urges total embargo on nuclear technology. Hans Blix at IAEA says there “is no cause for concern.”  In 1992, IAEA inspects facilities and finds no suspicious activities, though U.S. claims IAEA is not seeing the problematic sites.
1992.  Iran Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati repeatedly denies reports of Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions as well as the widespread reports that it has purchased nuclear weapons in Kazakstan.
Sept 1992.  Rafsanjani announces China will build a nuclear power plant in Iran, and will be subject to full-scope safeguards.  Four more power plants are part of the deal. AEOI chief Reza Amrollahi announces that Iran has signed a 15-year nuclear agreement with Russia.
February 1993.  CIA director Woolsey says Iran is 8-10 years from producing a nuclear weapon.
March 1994.  Among other officials’ frequent denials, Major General Mohsen Rezai, head of the Revolutionary Guard, says, “political logic, morality, our own culture, and above all the situation in today’s world does not allow us to have such deadly weapons.”
April 1994.  In Teheran to discuss a nuclear weapons free zone in the region, Hans Blix meets with the head of AEOI, the foreign minister, first deputy to the president, and deputy to the speaker of the Majlis. 
September 1994.  Iran threatens to withdraw from the NPT because of the West’s denial of peaceful nuclear technology, including pressure put on Russia, Pakistan, and other potential suppliers.
Feb. 1995.  Head of AEOI, Reza Amrollahi, says that Iran should have room to make independent decisions regarding its nuclear weapons future. 
May 1995.  Under pressure from the U.S., Boris Yeltsin announces Russia will not provide Iran with military-related nuclear technology, including gas centrifuges.  In Sept. 1995, Russia does proceed to complete the Bushwehr reactors.
June 1995.  The Financial Times reports a study by Ahmed Hashim of the Center for Strategic and International Studies claiming that “intense political factionalism” impedes Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons.
Feb. 1997.  An Austrian-built cyclotron, capable of uranium enrichment, is completed in Iran’s nuclear research center in Karaj.
July 1997.  Hans Blix again visits Iran’s facilities and sees no reason for alarm.
April 1998.  Revolutionary Guard commander Yahya Rahim Safavi is reported to have said, "Can we withstand American's threats and domineering attitude with a policy of détente? Can we foil dangers coming from America through dialogue between civilizations? Will we be able to protect the Islamic Republic from international Zionism by signing conventions to ban proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons?"
January 2000. The CIA says that Iran may be capable of producing a nuclear weapon now.
August 2000. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani addresses the nuclear threat to Iran and its response. "We have neighbors who, due to international competition, have gained nuclear weapons," he says. "We do recognize that it is their right to have such capabilities, and they have apparently done so. We have no other alternatives but to defend ourselves in view of these developments. Although we are not trying to obtain non-conventional weapons, we must however, be able to protect ourselves against such threats."
September 13, 2001. Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, says that Iran will be capable of producing an atom bomb by 2005.
September 2003. Iranian Guardian Council leader Jannati again urges Iran's withdrawal from the NPT. "What is wrong with considering this treaty on nuclear energy and pulling out of it? North Korea withdrew." According to The Telegraph (London), many fundamentalist clerics like Jannati share these views after looking to neighboring countries like Israel and Pakistan, which have not signed onto the NPT, and India, which has decided not to sign the protocol.
October 2003. Iran appoints a five-member team to determine Iran's stance toward the IAEA's deadline. The members are Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi; Minister of Information Ali Yunessi; Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani; Secretary of the High National Security Council Hassan Rowhani; and the supreme religious leader's adviser for international affairs, Ali Velayati.
21 October 2003. Iran concedes to demands of the IAEA after talks with Britain, France, and Germany, and confirms signing of NPT's Additional Protocol, allowing the UN watchdog open and unannounced inspections. Iran also agrees to suspend all "uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities." This is later reversed, contributing to the current crisis.

To be continued .....

 

Map of Iran's nuclear facilities           Full chronology

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